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Executive summary / briefing note 
Report context: 
This report was commissioned by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) following the 
publication of Lancaster University‟s Hull Flood Project and Hull Children‟s Flood Project.  Its 
principal purpose is to identify how findings made as a result of the two research projects could 
be integrated into the Cabinet Office‟s National Recovery Guidance (NRG), as a means to 
improve affected communities‟ ability to recover from emergency events. 
The report, in effect, details a desktop analysis of UK Civil Protection (CP) guidance, from a 
bottom-up perspective (i.e. using as its critical lens, the lived experiences of members of the 
public who were tested by the Hull flooding of 2007 and its aftermath). 
The Projects: 
Following the 2007 floods in Hull, the researchers worked with 42 flooded residents over an 18 
month period using in-depth qualitative techniques (e.g. diaries and group discussions) 
designed to capture the recovery process in real time.  During the course of this project, the 
idea for the children‟s project emerged from conversations with diarists, who were worried about 
the impacts that the recovery process was having on their children and grandchildren.  In total 
46 flood-affected children took part in the sibling project; some of whom were flooded at school 
but not at home and others were flooded both at school and at home. 
Clarification of definitions: 
As a means to elaborate and corroborate the contention expressed in NRG, that recovery is a 
“complex social and developmental process rather than just a remedial process”, the concepts 
of Resilience, Recovery and Event and Consequence Vulnerability are defined.  It is shown that 
these concepts are closely interlinked in the way they can influence a flood-affected individual, 
household, or community‟s „journey‟ through the recovery process toward rehabilitation.   
Taking this perspective the importance of regarding recovery coordination as an opportunity to 
problem-solve, rather than to „command and control‟, is discussed.  Four themes, which bear 
relevance for the CP-sector are then introduced and problematised.   
Recommendations for how these problems could be mitigated are introduced (Table 1) and 
suggestions are made for changes to the text of the current NRG. 
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Table 1: Themes and recommendations 
Theme identified Recommendation made 
The consequences of the ‘Recovery Gap’:  
There is a need to recognise that it can the participation in the 
recovery process (rather than simply the hazard experience 
alone), which can create vulnerability and increase the likelihood 
that people‟s recovery journey will be made more difficult.  For 
example, NRG currently fails to acknowledge the existence of the 
„recovery gap‟, which exists between the point where the 
assistance that is provided by the Civil Protection (CP) Sector 
ends and the services that are supplied by the private sector after 
a flood starts. 
Even if they were to have a plan, after an event, social groups may 
be vulnerable to „recovery-gap effects‟.  However, these groups 
may have their capacity for self-help bolstered by the provision of 
flexible „sign-posting and „hand-holding‟ advice and arbitration 
services.   
There should be an investigation of what role Local Authority staff, 
such as community-development workers or ‟community 
organisers‟ can play as recovery facilitators.  The aim would be to 
formally recognise what functions these professional boundary 
people have served in their communities after past emergencies.  
Such understanding could lead to a training programme, through 
which these staff could learn to identify recovery-related issues 
and to spot opportunities to create forums where affected 
communities could share experiences and by doing so, build their 
own capacity for developing self-help solutions 
Community Emergency Planning (CEP), for recovery: 
It is suggested that, in the context of the recovery gap, CEP has 
limited value in influencing how the recovery process is 
experienced (i.e. how do you plan for how to negotiate with 
insurance, loss adjusters, builders etc.?) 
The consequences for children and young people:   
The lack of guidance that is explicit to the needs of children and 
young people is highlighted.  Particular note is made of the fact 
that „recovery gap‟ effects can have life-changing implications for 
this group (i.e. they can influence exam results). 
It is recommended that any schools that have been affected by a 
disaster, or that take in students from other disaster-affected 
schools, should be strongly encouraged to seek outside expert 
guidance on how to best identify and assist any child or young 
person who might be disadvantaged by event or consequence 
effects. 
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Theme identified Recommendation made 
The consequences for Frontline Recovery Workers:  
 A typology of four categories of „Frontline Recovery Worker‟ 
illustrates that current guidance fails to recognise that a 
„surprising‟ range of workers have the opportunity to positively 
influence community recovery, whilst also being exposed to 
significant work-related pressures. 
 Emergency Planning staff should be encouraged to expand 
their links across a wider range of Local Authority departments 
and voluntary-sector organisations.  This should be done in 
order that effective contingencies for the mitigation of 
consequence vulnerabilities can be co-developed in slow time 
 A principal priority of the RCG should be to develop strategy 
that is fully informed by this frontline experience (i.e. there 
must be a way for information about community needs to 
travel from the bottom up, not just from the top down), e.g. it 
should be advocated that a „Community Team‟ representative 
sits on the RCG community engagement sub-group 
 It is also recommended that the value and challenges of 
frontline recovery work should be formally acknowledged, with 
an amendment to Chapter 7 of „Emergency Response and 
Recovery‟   
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The Hull Project Recovery game “Flood Snakes and Ladders” is introduced as a tool, which 
could be used in a number of training environments in order to teach participants about the 
complexity of the recovery process. 
Finally, an initial proposal for a project to investigate the role of Local Authority „Community‟ staff 
in long-term recovery is outlined. 
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1. Introduction 
This report was commissioned by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS) following the 
publication of Lancaster University‟s Hull Flood Project and Hull Children‟s Flood Project.  Its 
principal purpose is to identify how findings made as a result of the two research projects could 
be integrated into the Cabinet Office‟s National Recovery Guidance (NRG), as a means to 
improve affected communities‟ ability to recover from emergency events.  In addition to its main 
remit of drawing on lessons learned from the specific context of the Hull 2007 floods, it also 
includes insights from more recent, informal research that both authors have undertaken 
following flooding in Cumbria (Nov, 2009) and Cornwall (Nov, 2010). Equally, although flooding 
is the focus of the case studies discussed, where appropriate, more generic issues that may 
bear relevance to other kinds of emergency are highlighted.     
The report, in effect, details a desktop analysis of UK Civil Protection (CP) guidance.  However, 
this analysis was carried out in a bottom-up sense (i.e. using as its critical lens, the lived 
experiences of members of the public who were tested by the Hull flooding of 2007 and its 
aftermath), rather than by taking a top-down institutional perspective.  Accordingly, as requested 
by the Cabinet Office during commissioning, the report goes further than simply attempting to 
identify where minor wordings or nuances might be changed within existing templates and 
guidance documents.  It proposes ways in which the process of post-emergency recovery (as it 
is currently „delivered‟ by the CP sector) could be envisaged slightly differently by that sector.  
This is done as a way to place NRG within a context that bears greater relevance to hazard-
affected populations and to the more inclusive forum of agencies and institutions, over and 
above the Local Resilience Forum membership, which inevitably engage during recovery.            
Although the project was undertaken with respect to the statutory provisions detailed in the HM 
Government document Emergency Preparedness, and the non-statutory guidance described in 
Emergency Response and Recovery, the focus of the analysis concentrates on NRG and its 
associated guidance resources (e.g. the Recovery Plan Guidance Template). 
2. Lancaster University’s Hull Projects 
2.1 The Hull Flood Project 
Following the summer floods of 2007, a team from Lancaster University travelled to Hull, where 
over 8,600 homes were affected and one person died, in order to carry out a 2-year 
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investigation into what the long-term flood recovery process was like for people (Coulthard et 
al., 2007; Whittle et al., 2010)2.  During the study, the researchers worked with 42 flooded 
residents over an 18 month period using in-depth qualitative techniques designed to capture the 
recovery process in real time.  The methods used were based on a successful study of 
community recovery following the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease outbreak in Cumbria (Mort et 
al., 2004).  Upon recruitment, the participants gave an initial semi-structured interview which 
enabled them to tell their story of the floods so far.  At this point they were introduced to the 
weekly diary booklets that they were encouraged to keep throughout the duration of the project.  
The diaries started with a few simple „warm up‟ questions where participants were asked to rate 
their quality of life, relationships with family and friends, and health using a simple scale ranging 
from „very poor‟ to „very good‟.  However, the main section of the diaries was the „free-text‟ part, 
where they were encouraged to write about their lives that week.  To complement the diaries 
and interviews, the participants also met for group discussions at quarterly intervals during the 
project where they were able to discuss the issues that were facing them as a group. 
The final element of the methodology was a project steering group, which comprised local and 
national organisations with an interest in flood recovery3.   During the study the diarists engaged 
directly with the steering group through a series of group discussions and facilitated meetings, 
resulting in a high level of impact on policy and practice.  For example, the project was used as 
a case study during the development of the Cabinet Office‟s Strategic National Framework for 
Community Resilience. 
2.2 The Hull Children’s Flood Project 
The idea for the children‟s project emerged from conversations with diarists taking part in the 
main Hull Flood Project, who were worried about the impacts that the recovery process was 
having on their children and grandchildren.  The existing project was unable to capture these 
impacts and, as a result, Lancaster University launched a „sibling‟ project which looked at 
                                                 
2
 „Flood, Vulnerability and Urban Resilience: A real-time study of local recovery following the floods of 
June 2007 in Hull‟ was funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) and the Environment Agency 
 www.lec.lancs.ac.uk/cswm/hfp  
3
 The Hull Study had a steering group comprising the following organizations: Association of British 
Insurers, Humber Primary Care Trust, Cabinet Office, JBA Consulting, Diarist, Middlesex University, 
Environment Agency, National Flood Forum, Hull City Council, North Bank Forum, Hull Community and 
Voluntary Services, University of Cumbria, Hull Residents and Tenants Association, Yorkshire & Humber 
Neighbourhood Resource Centre. 
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children and young people‟s experiences of long-term flood recovery in Hull (Walker et al., 
2010)4.  
In total 46 flood-affected children took part in the project; some of whom were flooded at school 
but not at home and others were flooded both at school and at home.  The researchers worked 
in two schools that were badly affected by the floods, i.e. both schools were evacuated on the 
day and then closed for strip out and refurbishment. Of the young people involved, children from 
the two schools totalled 42, comprising 25 pupils from the primary school and 17 pupils from the 
secondary school. We used storyboards (where participants drew pictures or used creative 
writing to tell their stories), followed-up by short one‐to‐one interviews and group discussions. 
We also conducted telephone interviews with four flood-affected young people, accessed 
through the youth team in Hull. Finally, we worked with 18 adults, involving interviews with key 
service providers and frontline workers. 
The Children‟s Project also recruited a steering group that linked in to the steering group for the 
adults‟ project, but with the addition of specialists in children and young people‟s issues5. 
3. Setting the Scene: a clarification of working definitions 
In order to provide some context for the discussion, it should be understood that the focus of 
this report is on using the Hull research findings as a lens through which to critique the UK Civil 
Protection sector‟s current six-phase Integrated Emergency Management (IEM) approach6 to 
the delivery of long-term recovery.    
Straight away, it could be suggested that using an IEM approach, recovery only appears to bear 
relevance as a final stage; as a means to arrive at an aspired destination.  However, if IEM is 
viewed as a cyclical process, it also becomes the first stage of the iterative management 
approach.  Accordingly, decisions made in relation to this phase will likely influence the future 
resilience or vulnerability of any particular hazard-exposed population to future hazard impacts.  
Therefore, it becomes important to define here what resilience, recovery and vulnerability 
should be understood to mean, in terms of this report.  
                                                 
4 „Children, Flood and Urban Resilience: Understanding children and young people‟s experience and 
agency in the flood recovery process‟ was funded by the ESRC, the Environment Agency and Hull City 
Council www.lec.lancs.ac.uk/cswm/hcfp  
5
 Additional representatives on this steering group included the University of Surrey, Hull City Council 
Children and Young People‟s Services Departments and representatives from the participating schools. 
6
 The six phases of IEM are: anticipation; assessment; prevention; preparation; response; and recovery 
management (HM Government, 2005: p.8) 
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3.1 Resilience 
It is acknowledged that the definition of what constitutes „resilience‟ has become fertile ground, 
which has been sown from a variety of different perspectives (e.g. Adger, 2000; Folke, 2006; 
Gallopin, 2006; Klein et al., 2003), one of which encompasses the investigation of what 
resilience means in terms of UK Civil Protection (e.g. Coles & Buckle, 2004; Medd & Marvin, 
2005; O'Brien & Read, 2005).  Focusing on this civil protection perspective, the „After the Rain‟ 
final report (Whittle et al., 2010), looked at resilience in terms of how it could be applied to the 
understanding of recovery from flood events.  Taking this approach, resilience was broken down 
into four principal conceptualisations: 
 Resilience as resistance 
 Resilience as „bounce-back‟ 
 Resilience as adaptation, and; 
 Resilience as transformation (ibid. p.11) 
Importantly, it was revealed that these four types of resilience are not mutually exclusive and 
that they need not remain constant throughout the recovery period.  On the contrary, dynamic 
effects are revealed, as different types of resilience take precedence at different stages of the 
process7.  As a result of this finding, Whittle et al. argued that even though it can be categorised 
in these four distinct forms, resilience needs to be understood: 
 …in terms of relationships and processes rather than as a static characteristic of an 
individual, household, public service or community.  In other words, “resilience‟ is not so 
much a response to the flood hazard itself, but is an emergent characteristic of the way in 
which the flood response and the subsequent recovery process are managed. (ibid. p.12) 
Accepting this understanding of resilience as an emergent characteristic is important for two key 
reasons.  Firstly it shows us that resilience is fundamentally about the ability to recover (this is a 
point that we return to in Section 4.4).  Secondly, we can see that how the recovery process is 
managed is crucial to the development of resilience.  In short,  we must accept that building 
                                                 
7
 “First, we need to think about how types of resilience might be supportive rather than exclusive. A 
householder may be better prepared to “bounce-back‟ because of the adaptability of the social networks 
around him/her.  Second, therefore, the resilience of one entity – the individual, the household, the home 
– is a characteristic that emerges partly in relation to wider social, infrastructural and institutional 
networks.  For example, the resilience of a community is partly enabled precisely by the resilience of the 
infrastructure networks (drains, communications, transport) as well as of key services required.  Third, 
and crucially, what resilience is – and as a strategy what is appropriate – shifts over time.  During an 
event, resilience might be manifest as resistance and the ability to withstand the shock while during 
recovery it is manifest in terms of a community‟s ability to regenerate” (Whittle et al., 2010: p.12) 
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resilience into a hazard-exposed community is more complex than just getting people to adopt 
preparedness procedures such as signing up to warning systems and preparing „grab-bags‟ of 
medicines and important documents8.  Instead, we must understand that a person‟s exposure to 
the recovery-process itself, can stimulate or degrade their resilience.     
With this in mind, it now becomes appropriate to look more closely at how resilience is currently 
defined within relevant UK Civil Protection guidance. 
In terms of identifying a dominant conceptualisation of resilience that is used by UK Civil 
Protection practitioners, it quickly becomes clear that there is an element of discontinuity in the 
general approach.  For example, the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology (Version 2.0.1), 
definition of resilience refers to the:   
Ability of the community, services, area or infrastructure to detect, prevent, and, if 
necessary to withstand, handle and recover from disruptive challenges   
Taking the four types introduced above, this definition appears to relate to a system‟s ability to 
either resist or to „bounce-back‟ to its pre-existing state.  In effect the lexicon definition gives 
precedence to system continuity, which is inferred within these two types, rather than the 
system-changing resilience that is achieved through adaptation or transformation. 
However, in its recently published Strategic National Framework for Community Resilience, the 
preferred definition derives from the Demos report „Resilient Nation‟ (Edwards, 2009), which 
defines resilience as: 
“The capacity of an individual, community or system to adapt in order to sustain an 
acceptable level of function, structure, and identity.” (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.10) 
This is an important progression from the Lexicon definition, as it introduces the concept of 
resilience as adaptation.  However, whilst this definition recognises the potential of adaptation, it 
should be remembered that there is considerable evidence that ostensibly-resilient individuals, 
communities and societies (i.e. social entities) faced with hazards can actually be so because 
they favour actions that could be seen as, not adaptive in a positive sense, but actually 
maladaptive (e.g. using insurance as a means to simply reinstate flood-damaged properties with 
exactly the same vulnerabilities as before: Cutter & Emrich, 2006). 
The ability to adapt is not, therefore, as straightforward as the Demos definition suggests.  But, 
looking more closely, it can be seen that the Demos definition is itself derived from an 
                                                 
8
 See Deeming and Whittle (in prep) discussion paper for the Cabinet Office on Community Resilience 
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antecedent, which would be much more recognisable to disaster researchers, and which could 
be said to bear much greater salience for those who are interested of the complexity of the 
recovery process and the mitigation of its resilience-inhibiting effects.  The definition originates 
from the United Nations, International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, which defines resilience 
as the: 
“…capacity of a system
9
, community or society potentially exposed to hazards to adapt, by 
resisting or changing in order to reach and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and 
structure.  This is determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of 
organizing itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters for better future 
protection and to improve risk reduction measures.” (UN/ISDR, 2004)  
In this original - full - formulation, three additional factors are made explicit beyond the Demos 
truncation:   
(1) Resilience can be seen as not merely being indicated by adaptive potential, but, 
explicitly, by the ability of a social entity (e.g. individual, household, etc.) to adapt in the 
face of particular stimuli (in this case, hazards) 
(2) Resilience is seen as being dependent on the capacity of a social entity to self-organise 
(i.e. rather than simply respond to external coercion)    
(3) Resilience should not be judged simply in terms of a social entity‟s ability to adapt (i.e. 
change itself), but that to provide positive benefit (i.e. risk reduction), this adaptive 
change needs to be supported through the building up of an increased capacity for 
experiential learning 
Whilst the first point is useful, because it is always important to know what one needs to be 
resilient against, the second and third points are even more noteworthy.  Training and 
preparation will always remain fundamental to effective IEM (Alexander, 2002). However, 
suggesting that everything can be known in advance and planned for – in terms of how a hazard 
may behave or about how a social entity may respond to a hazard stimulus – is a fallacy 
(Clarke, 2005; Perrow, 1999).  Therefore, the self-organisational abilities, of improvisation and 
flexibility in newly-emergent situations, and the creative thinking that can be enhanced through 
learning, are here explicitly affirmed as vital indicators of system resilience (Kendra & 
Wachtendorf, 2003). 
                                                 
9
 In this context „system‟ should be treated as a synonym for „social entity‟ 
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In terms of investigating recovery, the [re]introduction of these three characteristics of resilience 
to our definition, provides an important perspective through which appropriate recommendations 
for recovery policy may be identified within the Hull project data.   
3.2 Recovery 
According to the Civil Protection Lexicon, recovery is defined as the: 
Process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency or 
disaster, continuing until the disruption has been rectified, demands on services have been 
returned to normal levels, and the needs of those affected have been met  
This is a useful definition, because it lays out a pathway to what might be considered to be three 
recognisable goals.  A community‟s recovery can be seen as finally occurring at a point where 
(1) hazard-induced disruptions are corrected (2) demands on services have returned to pre-
existing (i.e. normal) levels and (3) when the needs of those affected have been met. 
Strategically, the return of agencies and organisations to positions where they are operating 
within mainstream budgets and their staff are carrying „normal‟ workloads could be viewed, in 
these terms, as indicators of wider community recovery.  However, in terms of the final clause – 
meeting „the needs of those affected‟ – this is a much more subjective and, therefore, harder to 
quantify goal.      
From this „greyer‟ perspective the definition is given some extra context in the document 
Emergency Response and Recovery, which explains that recovery: 
 ... is more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed and the rehabilitation 
of those affected.  It is a complex social and developmental process rather than just a 
remedial process.  The manner in which recovery processes are undertaken is critical to 
their success.  Recovery is best achieved when the affected community is able to exercise 
a high degree of self-determination. (HM Government, 2009: p.101) 
This is a very useful clarification, because it acknowledges the complexity of recovery as a long-
term social and developmental process (Nigg, 1995).  However, even with this clarification, what 
the definition fails to make clear is that the phases of rebuilding (of physical structures), 
restoration (of physical systems and social patterns) and the rehabilitation (of the population, 
e.g. through a return of confidence) often do not follow a linear upward path (Rubin & Popkin, 
1990; Whittle et al., 2010).  Recovery, particularly as it is experienced at the household level, 
can be better described as a journey delineated by an unpredictable sequence of physical and 
emotional ups and downs, which can significantly speed or retard any perceived return to 
„normality‟.  
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This roller coaster trajectory is well characterised in a timeline produced by Caroline10, one of 
the Hull diarists (Figure 3.1), who clearly illustrates the sometimes quite subjective (and yet 
always affecting) frustrations, pressures and pleasures she experienced in the months following 
the flood.  
 
Figure 1:  Caroline’s Timeline.  An example of a householder’s psychological journey through recovery 
 
Effectively, for those like Caroline who experienced these events, the floods themselves were 
only the start.  What the Hull projects revealed was that the experience of flood recovery 
persists long after the rain and flood waters have gone. It extends long after the emergency 
services have returned to their day to day duties.  It is, therefore, an experience marked in part 
by coming to terms with the impact of the flood event itself.  However, it is through the process 
that follows, in the struggle of rebuilding the social and physical fabric of homes and 
communities, that the impact of flood is most felt.  The process of recovery is one that carries 
with it the challenge of adjusting to displacement (caravans, living upstairs, rented 
                                                 
10
 Pseudonym 
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accommodation, living with family), managing the process of physical recovery (loss adjustors, 
insurance companies, builders, retailers), trying to maintain “normality” in everyday life (work, 
school, child care, illness, deaths, births, celebrations) and trying to rebuild social life (adjust to 
a new home, new community relations, build trust in the future).  It is one that disrupts, reveals 
and produces forms of both vulnerability and resilience, forms that appear only on the margins 
of policy frameworks for support.  It is perhaps no wonder then that the Hull-study participants 
regarded their experiences of the recovery process to be worse than their experience of the 
original flood event. 
What this non-linear path illustrates then is that, in order to „deliver‟ effective recovery, there is a 
need to take account of and develop contingencies for effects which only emerge over the long-
term.  This need is particularly acute given that a further key conclusion of the Hull Studies is 
that vulnerability to hazards is not a static concept that can be defined solely with reference to 
socio-economic criteria such as age or income (Walker et al., 2010; Whittle et al., 2010). 
Instead, vulnerability was found to shift over time as the ways in which the recovery process 
was managed intersected with people‟s personal and family circumstances (for example, illness 
and family crises as we saw in Caroline‟s example).  Given such conclusions, the principal 
consideration should, therefore, be finding ways to determine when and why particular groups 
or individuals become vulnerable during the recovery process, and what can best be done to 
mitigate that condition.  In order to help with this task it might be useful to take a social-
vulnerability perspective and, particularly, an idea introduced by Nigg and Miller (1994), which 
suggested that hazards and ensuing disasters should be acknowledged as revealing two types 
of vulnerability (i.e. event and consequence).   
3.3 Event and Consequence Vulnerability 
Event vulnerability was originally conceived as a term to describe the fragility of certain 
individuals and social groups to earthquakes, or their susceptibility to loss from such exposure.  
Expanding this concept to include flooding, it is clear that certain groups can indeed be 
regarded as particularly vulnerable to this hazard too (e.g. the poor, the elderly, the disabled, 
children, households containing child carers of dependant adults: Thrush et al., 2005; 
Ramsbottom et al., 2005).  Also, at a national scale, populations experiencing multiple 
deprivation (which can include high proportions of these vulnerable groups) have been shown to 
be disproportionately exposed to sea-flood hazards than are less-deprived (more resource-full?) 
populations (Walker et al., 2006). 
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Consequence vulnerability, on the other hand, is less to do with an individual‟s physical frailty 
and more to do with their susceptibility to the wider, indirect, impacts of the event and its 
aftermath.  Crucially, then, this concept can be used to illustrate how the mismanagement of 
recovery may result in those who were not originally vulnerable becoming so in the longer-term. 
For example, low-income private-sector tenants may well be physically fit and able to avoid 
injury during a flood, but, they are more likely than others to be uninsured (Priest et al., 2005) 
and, therefore, bear increased susceptibility to the irredeemable loss of personal property and 
possessions.  Tenants can also find it particularly hard to find suitable alternative 
accommodation after an event or, even worse, can have their situations taken advantage of by 
unscrupulous landlords (e.g. by being made to maintain full rent payments in order to stay in 
unrepaired and unhealthy properties: Dash et al., 1997; Whittle et al., 2010)11.  Adults, though, 
are not the only ones to bear consequence vulnerabilities; as we will see in Section 4.2‟s 
discussion of children‟s experiences, below. 
4. Identifying consequence vulnerabilities in Hull  
The differentiation between event and consequence vulnerability is useful in terms of helping to 
understand what affected populations are experiencing and, particularly, why sometimes 
unexpected vulnerabilities can evolve as the emergency shifts from its response phase and 
enters the more nebulous dimension of recovery.  In effect, it provides an wider perspective on 
how vulnerability should be assessed by CP practitioners, than has yet been substantively 
written into guidance (e.g. Cabinet Office, 2008).  This section will add to this understanding, by 
using the concept of consequence vulnerability as a lens through which to examine four 
different aspects of recovery, which could be said to represent particular blind spots in current 
guidance.   
4.1 The consequences of the ‘Recovery Gap’ 
A major outcome of the Hull studies has been the addition of the „Recovery Gap‟ concept to the 
CP vocabulary.  The „recovery gap‟, is something that appears during the longer process of 
recovery, at the point where the legally-defined contingency arrangements, provided for the 
affected community by its local authority and other agencies, diminish and where the less well-
defined services provided by the private sector (e.g. insurance, building industry) start.  For 
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 Whilst conducting the Hull research and during fieldwork following the Cumbria flooding in 2009, the 
authors heard anecdotal evidence that private tenants were staying, quietly and without drawing attention 
to themselves, in unhealthy flood-damaged properties, because they feared that it would be impossible to 
find suitable alternative accommodation in the area.      
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some, the gap can open very quickly, whilst for others its arrival is slower and more pernicious.  
Taking a  vulnerability perspective, the use of the recovery gap concept helps to illustrate a 
pre/post event vulnerability differentiation, by explaining why even ostensibly „resilient‟ people 
(e.g. those who are insured), can also experience unpredictable recovery journeys, not as a 
result of the original hazard agent, but due to the fact that they are involved in a process.  A 
process that is not being driven by themselves, but by the actions of others (e.g. to achieve 
formal settlement, they are reliant on insurers and loss adjusters communicating with each other 
as well as with them). 
So, returning to the definitions briefly, in addition to failing to peg the non-linearity of the 
recovery process, the CP definition of recovery implies that the management of the recovery 
process can be understood – when viewed from the strategic level – to only require the 
provision and coordination of a relatively exclusive selection of all the assistance that an 
affected community actually requires and/or values during the period.  The repair of roads and 
bridges is undoubtedly a vital driver of community recovery, and represents positive action that 
is easy to quantify in terms of success.  However, at the household level, the „juggling‟ skills that 
are required to cope with the day-to-day pressures, the dealing with displacement, the need to 
develop additional „project-management‟ skills and the need to maintain and rebuild normality 
for the household, requires more than fixed roads and more even than re-opened shops and 
cleared drains.   
Therefore, whilst it is absolutely correct to portray recovery as a “complex social and 
developmental process”, there is one particular factor that current guidance still fails to engage 
with at any substantive level.  That is that the principal reason that many recovery journeys are 
so arduous, is the fact that, in the UK, the delivery of the thing called „recovery‟ does not simply 
involve public, voluntary and community-sector actors delivering assistance (e.g. rest centres, 
repaired bridges, one-off aid payments: Quarantelli, 1999). Instead this is actually an arena 
where many „survivors‟12 also need to „negotiate‟13 the best value possible for themselves from 
private-sector services (e.g. insurance).  Looking at recovery in these terms, it becomes clearer 
that in large part, recovery is not something that is experienced as a community enterprise, but 
something that has been reduced to a much more individualised level (Deeming et al., in press).  
                                                 
12
 A self-descriptive term agreed amongst the diarists, to be used in preference to „victims‟ 
13
 Diarists referred to experiencing perceptions of unfairness when they only realised, after the fact, that 
pay-out settlements made by insurers could actually be negotiated upward; it was not necessarily a case 
of accepting the first offer made.  This was something they felt should have been made clear from the 
outset. 
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Arguably, this individualisation makes recovery harder for residents, particularly for those who 
have no prior experience of nurturing the skills needed during this time (such as knowing how to 
make an insurance claim or how to project-manage builders), as it leaves them with no point of 
comparison and, therefore, no way of knowing if the companies they are dealing with are 
managing their case in a fair or proper way. So if dealing with household insurers, loss adjusters 
and builders is very much a one-to-one activity, this begs a question:  If significant numbers of 
people are being isolated and/or made vulnerable by this individualising experience, is NRG 
currently comprehensive enough so as to alert the appropriate organisations to their plight in 
order that they can implement appropriate contingencies for this group?   
Looking at Recovery Guidance from this bottom-up perspective, it becomes clear that there is a 
disconnect between what institutions such as the Recovery Coordination Group (RCG) are 
geared to provide (e.g. public meetings, temporary housing, clean streets and waste collection), 
and the additional requirements of the affected public (e.g. their need for advice on how to deal 
with an authoritarian insurance agent, so as to avoid being left with an unfair or inadequate 
settlement).  This disconnection will be returned to later.   
4.2 The consequences for children and young people 
Whilst they can be surprisingly resilient to a hazard event (it can actually be quite exciting), 
children and young people form one group who can experience significant consequences 
throughout the roller-coaster ride of recovery; a group whose needs are only touched upon 
within current recovery guidance.   
The Hull Children‟s Project revealed that all children and young people should be considered as 
potentially vulnerable during recovery.  This is because any individual child can suffer significant 
disruptions to their home, their social and their school lives, which in the worst cases can span 
right across what are acknowledged to be fundamentally important stages of their educational 
and social development (e.g. when „moving-up‟ from primary to secondary school, or leading up 
to and during exam years).   
The project identified that teaching staff felt that flood-affected pupils were being let down.  For 
example, the fact that children needed to be transported greater distances to and from 
(undamaged) schools for their lessons, meant that they lost teacher contact time.  As staff 
would have normally used this time to engineer opportunities through which they could help 
struggling pupils achieve better exam results, it becomes easy to see why losing it would leave 
the staff so disheartened.  Such expressed concerns suggest that poorly managed recovery 
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really can have life-changing effects on children‟s future potential (i.e. it can mean the difference 
between passing and failing exams). 
The current NRG case studies from Buncefield, Yorkshire and Humber and, to a lesser extent, 
Lewes, provide some useful information on provisions that were made for children and young 
people after these specific events (e.g. an art competition to “collect reminiscences” of 
Buncefield), but the guidance itself could be described as being „benignly neglectful‟ (Revere, 
2011) of this group‟s vulnerabilities.  For example, a search of the NRG pages for information 
explicitly on children and young people reveals a link to roles and responsibilities regarding 
educational provision (i.e. provision of suitable buildings etc.) and to literature on identifying 
those suffering PTSD after disasters (even if that guidance is for healthcare professionals in 
healthcare establishments, rather than for teachers in schools).  Considering that the argument 
here is that it is not necessarily the „event‟ which may cause this group problems but the 
consequences (i.e. it may not be PTSD), it seems unfortunate that it is necessary to delve into 
the Department of Health advice on Planning for the psychosocial and mental health care of 
people affected by major incidents and disasters (linked from Needs of people – health), in 
order to find very useful information, which points out that children and young people may suffer 
both direct and indirect (i.e. event and consequence) disaster effects.  This advice states: 
“ …education providers as well as disaster planners require advice on matters pertaining to 
children‟s psychosocial needs and care from professionals who are trained and 
experienced in working with children.  Schools should be encouraged to play their full roles 
in assisting children and families after disasters and major incidents.  The support of 
teachers and other staff who are familiar to them are usually very effective and experienced 
by children as an extension of ordinary life.  Often, therefore, the risks from disruption that 
accrue from introducing counsellors into recovery scenarios, albeit that they are trained, 
outweigh the advantages.  It is better that trained people work indirectly through advising 
and supervising adults with whom children are familiar. (Department of Health, 2009: p.30) 
Notwithstanding the fact that this explicit guidance exists, our research found that Head 
Teachers in some schools (which were not flooded, but where flood-affected children were 
registered) had been found to resist support from specialists (e.g. educational psychologists), 
even when it was offered, by stating that „the school could cope‟ by itself. Given that the 
Children‟s Project identified several occasions where teachers were surprised to learn – as a 
direct result of the research activities – that individuals in their care were suffering recovery-
related anxieties (Walker et al., 2010), is it time for the lack of positive advocacy in the NRG for 
specialist support in child welfare issues to be revisited? 
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4.3 The consequences for Frontline Recovery Workers   
Guidance on the care for and the consideration of frontline worker issues forms a 3-page sub-
section within Emergency Response and Recovery (HM Government, 2009).  Therefore, 
suggesting that the CP-sector lacks an understanding of these issues may seem unreasonable.  
However, what the Hull research has found is that, whilst the published guidance concentrates 
on the welfare of “rescuers and response workers”, there may be employees and employers 
carrying out frontline recovery work, who don‟t even realise that this existing guidance could 
relate to them too.  Importantly, in concentrating solely on „rescue and response workers‟, this 
guidance appears neglectful of available evidence, which suggests that the consideration of the 
physical, emotional and psychological welfare needs of staff, as well as health and safety 
related considerations, should not end at the first incident debrief, but should extend long into 
the recovery period (Convery et al., 2007; Department of Health, 2009; Whittle et al., 2010).  
Think of frontline workers in relation to flooding and the images that come to mind tend to be of 
the people involved in the immediate emergency response efforts – for example, the Fire and 
Rescue Service, Police, Environment Agency staff and other emergency services workers. 
However, deciding who counts as a frontline worker during the longer-term recovery process is 
more difficult as the diversity of workers and their roles is so great.  Following Convery et al.’s 
contention that “the frontline often emerges in unexpected places” (2008: p.114) the Hull 
Projects identified four types of worker who could be classified as frontline: 
 Permanent and temporary staff whose jobs were created specifically to deal with the issue of 
flood recovery.  For example, Charlotte
14
 was employed by Hull City Council‟s Flood Advice 
Service through which she provided assistance to flooded residents – both over the telephone 
and in person – on a range of issues, from dealing with insurance claims to resolving issues with 
building contractors and helping poorer residents access additional forms of financial aid.  
 Those whose pre-existing job roles were transformed to deal with flooding issues.  The best 
example of this in Hull was the work of the community wardens. Hull‟s community wardens work 
in neighbourhood teams across the city to help residents with issues of concern to them, such as 
anti-social behaviour, vandalism and environmental problems. However, after the floods, the 
wardens were enlisted to perform a range of activities, from evacuating schools and care homes 
on the day of the floods, through to helping residents fill out assistance forms and performing 
caravan safety checks during the longer-term recovery process.  Another important example of 
this type of role extension would be school staff (i.e. teachers, but also assistants and caretakers) 
who bore considerable, deeply-institutionalised, responsibility for the welfare and support of their 
                                                 
14
 A diarist from the adults‟ project 
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pupils and who worked through their summer holidays on the repairs to the school and 
arrangements relating to the temporary relocation of their pupils 
 “Traditional” intermediary roles.  The flood recovery process consisted of a heightened role for 
well-known intermediaries who exist to bridge the gap between individual residents and the 
various companies and agencies that they need to deal with after a flood.  The clearest example 
of this is the work of the loss adjusters and the Citizen‟s Advice Bureau.  
 Informal work that was carried out in a voluntary capacity by community groups across the city.  
For example, Hazel
15
 belonged to a church in the heart of a badly flooded area of the city.  She 
described how, despite having only 17 members, the church was able to respond flexibly and 
quickly to the needs of the local community in ways that were impossible for larger, more 
bureaucratic organizations that were restricted by funding constraints or organizational protocols 
regarding recovery  
It was found that many of those involved in these types of expanding extending or emergent 
(Bardo, 1978) work roles found the experience to be very positive, with perceived rewards 
including CVs enhanced with new skills and the feeling that they were really helping people.  
For those that held the dual roles of recovery worker and also of flood survivor in their own right, 
the experience of working for others allowed them to put their own hardships into perspective, 
and also to empathise with those they were dealing with.  It should be clearly understood, 
however, that those who were forced by circumstances to carry out this dual role, found the 
overall experience to be extremely arduous.    
The research also found that when individuals were able to work flexibly on their own initiative, 
there were also considerable pay-backs for their communities and also for their employing 
organisation.  For example, staff from the Hull City Council‟s Community Team were able to use 
their local knowledge and social networks to identify problems and deliberate solutions more 
quickly than might otherwise have been the case.  This led to staff feeling very positive about 
their roles.      
Whilst there were these positive examples, however, disaster work is never going to be easy.  
Therefore, workers also reported a number of specific issues that made their work more difficult.  
Some of these workers felt they had a lack of support from their employers.  This was 
particularly so for those bearing the dual role, who felt their employers did not recognize that 
they were also “flood victims” with needs.  Within their organisations there was a reported lack 
of formal opportunities to debrief with colleagues, a lack of basic equipment and resources (e.g. 
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 An interviewee from the adults‟ project 
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protective clothing, food and drink), and a failure by organisations to learn from the experiences 
of these workers.  One example of this related to a worker who became stressed when having 
to carry out activities that she felt were ineffective and unfair; as she wrote in her diary: 
“I was closing cases at work this week (signing off those properties which had been 
supposedly finished).  I felt that this was premature as I knew from first-hand experience 
that this was not always the case.  I was uneasy about this as I felt this was more to do with 
massaging figures than actual progress!” Diarist Charlotte (Whittle et al., 2010: p.88)  
Using examples such as these to critique strategic-level decisions may seem unfair.  However, 
this was not the only example of this type of decision being made, where seemingly arbitrary 
dates were used to create cut-offs by which time recovery-designated work had to be completed 
(e.g. dates by which emergency-related funds must be spent).   It is important to point out that 
the impression left by such actions on the public, and on the frontline workers who are dealing 
with the public, is not positive.  These emergency-budgets to mainstream-budgets spreadsheet 
exchange exercises may be important in terms of financial management, or in terms of 
reputation management (e.g. in the sense that people can say “We „recovered‟ before the first 
anniversary of the emergency!”).  But, what they risk doing is not only putting into jeopardy the 
recovery trajectory of some households that are already experiencing more protracted 
disruptions than others, but they also cause embarrassment and distress for those working at 
the interface between these households and those organisations.  That these arbitrary 
deadlines are used, regardless of the frontline worker concerns, suggests that recovery is not 
being determined by the community itself (as is the apparent aspiration), but by an 
unresponsive and inflexible bureaucracy.  Such actions also go against Eyre‟s observation that:  
Crucially, although some flexibility is necessary, workers need some indication of how long 
[any post-disaster recovery] service will be maintained and that the work is supported and 
valued by their department.  Otherwise failure to provide a secure environment for the work 
is likely to undermine the extent to which staff feel they can work effectively. (Eyre, 2006: 
p.78) 
4.4 Community emergency planning, for recovery 
Making slightly different use of the Hull research, this section will briefly discuss the final of the 
four introduced themes by using data gathered during a final group discussion conducted in 
early 2011 between two couples (i.e. four individuals) involved in the original Hull research.  The 
purpose of the group was to develop a case study for one specific activity, which has been 
proposed as a way to mitigate both event and consequence vulnerability in the future; 
Community Emergency Planning (CEP).  However, while this discussion did yield useful material 
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for such a case study, it also generated insights into the concept of CEP itself which allowed us 
to identify gaps and suggest the improvements highlighted here. 
It is clear that the UK Government is keen to increase individual and community resilience 
against emergencies.  However, the current government focus on community-resilience building 
falls almost entirely on promoting activities based on preparedness and response.  For example, 
the recently published Community Resilience Framework states that “emergencies happen 
[and] preparing yourself and your family will make it easier to recover from the impacts of an 
emergency”.  
This is a limited perspective, because as the preceding discussion illustrates, the speed at 
which recovery, restoration and rehabilitation „to an acceptable level of functioning‟ is achieved 
is actually dependent upon more factors than those encompassed in any individual‟s or 
community‟s ability to plan and respond to hazard.  The Cabinet Office‟s concentration on 
preparedness and response is understandable (i.e. it is driven by the need to comply with the 
CCA).  However, the follow-up research in Hull, which was commissioned for this report, has 
revealed that at least some individuals, who have been physically affected by flood hazards, 
and who have experienced considerable challenges in attaining some form of rehabilitation, 
would still not consider response-focused community emergency planning to be a priority in 
terms of reducing their future risks. 
Clearly it would be wrong to draw any sweeping conclusions from this follow-up research, which 
involved a very small number of people who had experienced a particularly idiosyncratic 
surface-water flood event in a large urban area.  They, along with the rest of the city‟s 
population, had little or no prior experience of such a hazard and little or no direct warning 
(Coulthard et al., 2007).  Therefore, consideration needs to be given as to whether the 
information gained from these research participants is directly transferable or representative of 
what is thought by other populations exposed to different types of hazard.  Nonetheless, the 
discussion, combined with subsequent conversations that the authors have had with academics, 
frontline workers and practitioners working in the CP field, as well as with the diarists 
themselves, raised some interesting questions that warrant further investigation. 
When asked about CEP during this discussion the Hull diarists did agree that, since the flooding 
in 2007, they had developed basic contingencies that they could implement if ever they feared 
they would be flooded again (e.g. they would use planks to create raised shelving upon which to 
place vulnerable possessions and they now store insurance documents upstairs).  However, 
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Box 2: Excerpt from Beccy Whittle‟s summary of final focus-group discussion with 
Hull diarists (21
st
 February 2011)  
In this excerpt, the group is discussing Ian and Isobel‟s experience – the couple 
were coming back from holiday on the day of the floods and, consequently, felt 
that there was little they could have done to save their home. 
Interviewer: If there had been a community plan in place and you had been 
coming back from holiday, would you have had a bit more confidence then? 
Ian: I wouldn‟t have been so worried about community planning but I think I‟d have 
been able to do a lot more if I‟d been here.  
Here Carl and Leanne – who were in Hull on the day of the flood – disagree and 
think there would have been little that Ian could have done  
Ian: I could have taken a lot more stuff upstairs. I mean John was running back 
and forth like somebody demented trying to cover 2 houses [John is their son-in-
law who lives at the other end of the same street and was trying to look after his 
home too]. 
Isobel: I mean John was worrying about how our Paula [his wife] was going to get 
home from work.  He‟d had to pick the kids up from school so he had two boys to 
look after. 
Continued… 
thinking beyond the household scale, these „plans‟ were not examples of planning in the sense 
of written checklists or telephone trees, but at most, examples of informal arrangements that 
might reduce losses in the immediate run-up to an event  (e.g. keys being shared with 
neighbours so they could get in to raise valuables if the owner was absent).  These „plans‟ could 
not really, therefore, be regarded as examples of community planning.  More accurately they 
represent evidence of learning from harsh hazard-taught lessons.  Their experiences had 
instilled in these individuals that in a large-scale emergency you are, ultimately, on your own 
and that it is you that needs to keep making decisions, rather than wasting energy hoping, 
either, that the „thing‟ that is occurring will stop (i.e. what could be described as King Canute 
syndrome), or that someone else [even a fellow member of a closely-bonded social network] will 
act in your interests as effectively as you do yourself (Box 2).  
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The fact that the diarists‟ afforded actions to save personal possessions priority status in their 
„plans‟ is hardly surprising and could mean that the consequences of future flooding on these 
households may be reduced.  However, this is not necessarily due to the fact that such actions 
are particularly effective; it relates more to research findings that suggest that if people are 
given the opportunity to save possessions of sentimental value, then this can act to reduce 
mental trauma in the post-event period (Fielding et al., 2007).  It must be remembered that after 
the flood in 2007 the predominant recovery process (i.e. that which was largely dictated by the 
bureaucracies of the insurance/building industries, rather than the Civil Protection sector) 
tended to focus on restoring properties on a like-for-like basis; an approach which apparently 
included the repair of social housing that was owned and operated by the Category 1 
responder, Hull City Council (Coulthard et al., 2007).  This meant that very few physical-
resilience measures were ever installed (e.g. sockets were not raised above flood level) and 
properties, although decorated in a more ubiquitous “brown and cream” colour than before, 
were restored to a physical condition that was, essentially, just as vulnerable to floodwater 
damage as before.   
 
Ian:  You‟re more aware of what needs protecting in terms of personal stuff 
Leanne: Well, we couldn‟t do any more even though we were there 
General agreement  
Carl: I don‟t think it would have made any difference because he [meaning John, Ian 
and Isobel‟s son-in-law] didn‟t come from a dry area – he had his own house to save 
as well, didn‟t he? So he was divided. Here, next door was trying to help Leanne with 
the garage but then theirs started to flood and they had to go and do theirs so 
Leanne lost her help. And then when I got home it had started to affect the house so 
we were trying to save that.  
Leanne: Even with a contingency plan, even with things in place, you can only do so 
much. Because you‟re all individual and you‟re all trying to save your own stuff – all 
your personal stuff 
General agreement  
 
20 
 
This is a fundamental point in terms of recovery and resilience building, because it has been 
found that due to the modern preference for fitted carpets, flooring and furniture and the fact that 
these items cannot be readily moved out of harm‟s way – even if a warning is broadcast, 
received and understood and even if effective action is taken (Mileti & Sorensen, 1990) – the 
amount of financial loss that is avoided by raising what can be raised, is actually surprisingly 
small (Parker et al., 2007) (Box 3). Therefore, it is likely that, regardless of what plans are made 
in terms of preparing oneself for inundation, the amount of disruption and stress that is incurred, 
during the rebuilding and restoration of all these unmoveable items, is likely to be almost as 
severe as if no plans were made at all. 
 
Such findings, along with the fact that, for complex reasons, people living on floodplains tend 
not to regard themselves as being responsible for flood defence (Deeming et al., in press; 
Box 3: Resilient and resistant reinstatement 
Thinking specifically about the repair of properties that have already been flood affected, for 
householders residing in areas exposed to an annual flood-hazard probability of less than 
2% (1 in 50 year), it is highly unlikely that any insurance company will consider financing 
post-event reinstatement, which includes anything but the most basic flood resilient or 
resistant measures: it would be neither cost effective nor practically effective for them to do 
so (ABI, 2009b; Defra, 2008).  This would apply even if such measures were to be 
„permanent‟, in the sense that the householder would not need to be present or be required 
to take any direct action on receipt of a specific warning in order to make the savingτ.  The 
insurance industry does suggest that domestic property owners should always consider 
reducing losses, by investing in their own resilient and/or resistant counter-measures 
themselves (ABI, 2009a).  However, there is evidence to suggest that even though flood-
affected householders have followed this advice, there has been no acknowledgement of this 
voluntary risk reduction by the industry in terms of reduced insurance policy excesses or 
premiums (Bell, 2011; Harries, 2010).  
τ i.e. as would be the case with fitting demountable flood „resistant‟ measures like 
floodboards, which to achieve their designed effect, need (1) someone to be present to 
fit them (2) to be fitted correctly and (3) to be fitted in such a way that water cannot 
simply bypass them (e.g. through an adjoining, unprotected, property, or simply by 
percolating through the ground) 
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Harries & Borrows, 2007; Steinführer & Kuhlicke, 2009), only serves to emphasise the fact that 
the recovery process, as it has been physically experienced by the Hull residents and others, 
equates to little more than a straightforward reproduction of vulnerability.   
So, did the diarists offer anything positive in terms of how planning might improve resilience?  
Perhaps; but instead of thinking about the constraints they placed on planning for responding to 
future hazards, we need to return to our definition of resilience and consider what these diarists‟ 
experiences have taught them about improving their future ability to recover. 
It was the Hull research that originally led to the definition of the recovery gap (see Section 4.1).  
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that in their final discussion the diarists spoke less about the 
lessons they had learned for preparedness and response and more about the lessons that they 
had learned about recovery, as a result of the problems they had faced in trying to negotiate 
their way through this public/private-sector divide.  For example, when asked what they would 
do after another flood, they suggested that they would think very carefully before they opted to 
live upstairs or in a caravan on the driveway again, purely on the grounds of their own health 
protection and stress reduction. 
The issue of negotiation came up too.  The diarists had learned that, instead of allowing an 
insurance company to prescribe the pace of the process (e.g. by allowing it to use its own loss 
adjustors and builders), it could be better to demand a settlement from the company in order 
that the householder could commission their own trusted builders direct.  The main Hull Flood 
Project revealed that many diarists had not known that this was even an option before16, but 
learning from the experience of others during the course of their recovery journeys as well as 
through the group sessions involved in taking part in our research had given them more 
confidence to argue (or “fight”) their corner more effectively in the future:  
 “At the beginning you think you have to do everything by the book and „jump‟ when the 
insurance people say „jump‟ - which isn‟t true at all but you only learn these things as you 
go along and talk to other people.” Hull Diarist during final focus group 
Such alternatives may not, however, be open to all.  Project management like this takes time 
and requires a certain amount of psychological strength and „savvy‟.  Unfortunately, already 
vulnerable individuals and households may lack these resources.  From this perspective, Hull 
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 This is another example of the problems brought on by the highly individualised way in which recovery 
is managed through the private sector – see original discussion in Section 4.1 
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City Council‟s „Gold, Silver and Bronze‟ priority system17 was regarded positively, as a 
commendable approach to identifying vulnerable households and prioritising their works.  As 
Paul Hendy of the National Flood Forum (NFF) was quoted as saying, this system meant that 
people in severe financial hardship could have the stress taken “out of their lives and weight off 
their minds” (HCC, 2007).  However, according to the Hull research, once the initial council 
visits had been conducted and the first tranche of support distributed, those afforded the most 
basic support package (i.e. bronze) were left feeling very much on their own and as though they 
had nobody to go to for advice or advocacy18.  Sadly, these feelings of isolation did not just 
affect those people who had been insured but who were „fighting‟ to obtain what they 
considered to be a fair treatment and settlement.  Even those in social housing could feel 
themselves slaves of the repair schedules, which were decided between the council and its 
contractors and over which they felt they had no control.  For all these people, the long-term 
recovery journey involved expending considerable time and energy on the mental and emotional 
„work‟ of trying to chase the council and worrying when things were not completed as originally 
promised (Whittle et al., 2010).  
But services cannot go on indefinitely and local authorities cannot really be expected to „hand-
hold‟ ever-reducing minorities of their constituents through their recovery from discrete hazard 
events; especially if that process is going to persist through months and years.  Councils and 
their operating partners are faced with continual pressure on their budgets and the need to 
prioritise resources.  Therefore, given the critique outlined in this section, is there ever some 
point at which „recovery coordination‟ can revert into being just another day at the office? 
This is an important question, which will be broached again later in the next section. 
 
  
                                                 
17
 Not to be confused with the IEM based Gold/Silver/Bronze incident-management hierarchy these 
categories were: Gold - These were the most vulnerable citizens, i.e. over 60yrs old, people with 
disabilities or single parents with children under 5yrs old: Silver - Anyone not falling into the Gold 
category, but without Home insurance: Bronze - Anyone affected who was not Gold or Silver.   
 
18
 Section 4.3 discusses how workers providing flood-specific services became concerned when they 
were terminated, because they knew people were still relying on them (Whittle et al., 2010). 
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5. Discussion and recommendations: thinking about recovery, from 
the bottom up 
“There is absolutely no difference between those in uniforms and hard hats and those 
without. This is happening to us all” 
Bob Parker, Mayor of Christchurch NZ., 
speaking after the earthquake of 22
nd
 February 2011 (Perkins, 2011) 
This discussion has now corroborated and elaborated the contention made in National 
Recovery Guidance (NRG) that recovery is “a complex social and developmental process rather 
than just a remedial process”.  It has also identified four themes, which are not fully engaged by 
NRG, but which have been shown here to bear the potential to influence the course of the 
recovery, through the introduction of various consequence vulnerabilities.  This section will now 
discuss these themes in concert and suggest ways in which contingencies for them might be 
integrated more comprehensively into NRG.  
The first thing to say at this point is that, of all the pages of NRG, the comments made here 
should not be understood to represent an asymmetric attack on something that is irrevocably 
bad or wrong, but as attempts to make an already good resource better.  On the whole, the 
NRG appears to lay out consistent, useful advice and where more detail is needed then readers 
are directed to appropriate external resources.  If recovery plans are to be regarded as living 
documents, which can be brought down from a shelf, read and followed by people who (1) might 
never have seen the document before and/or (2) may be „live‟ in the midst of their first 
emergency19, then the majority of this guidance clearly serves a purpose.  In terms of guiding 
the actions and decisions of any newly formed RCG, making them aware of the complexity and 
potential length of the recovery process they are about to oversee, and highlighting the need to 
consider the provision of resources such as advice and counselling services (in addition to 
finding ways and means to get roads repaired) is genuinely valuable.  Without doubt, NRG and 
its associated resources (e.g. the recovery plan template) should be regarded as being a 
considerable improvement over previous, more ad hoc approaches. 
However, using the Hull research findings as a lens through which to review NRG has revealed 
some interesting and potentially important gaps.  That these gaps exist suggests that a number 
                                                 
19
 This is the description, given to the author, of how Cornwall‟s newly published Strategic Recovery Plan 
was brought to the attention of the members of the RCG as they gathered together for the first time during 
the flood event in the county in November 2010  
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of factors that have been found to influence recovery at the community and the household level 
can remain invisible to people who really should know about them. 
Specifically, looking at what has been published, current NRG could be said to be ambivalent 
toward several recovery issues and, particularly, in its treatment of the recovery gap (see 
Section 4.1).  This ambivalence also appears in the issues surrounding children and young 
people (see Section 4.2), where guidance is made available through links, but where, perhaps, 
there is insufficient elaboration of the fact that the long-term consequences of emergencies and 
disasters can be potentially life-changing for this group and that these consequences are, 
therefore, worthy of proactive mitigation.   
The welfare and importance of frontline recovery workers too, receives the most cursory 
attention (see paragraph 2 in Recovery Guidance – generic issues), even though research 
suggests that these people can suffer real stress as a result of their needing to work in new and 
challenging ways.  From a community self-help perspective, the opportunity to highlight the 
value of these workers‟ potential to form important conduits for two-way information flow, 
between the affected community and the strategy-building RCG, is also missed.   
Thinking about the recovery gap, NRG states that affected communities may need “hand-
holding through or sophisticated signposting to systems of support and advice” and it also points 
out that there should be “psychological / counselling provisions for mental health issues 
including trauma” (see „Needs of People – non-health‟).  Such contingencies (e.g. the provision 
of one-stop-shop type advice centres) have, indeed, been found to be popular with affected 
communities and have become part of the arsenal of measures that are now regularly deployed 
by the recovery organisations.  However, there is no explicit guidance on what such 
„handholding‟ should be seeking to achieve or how it should be conducted, other than the 
implication that such aims should be agreed in advance by the Recovery Co-ordinating Group 
(RCG).  On the ground, this lack of guidance could mean that (e.g.) advice centres could be 
shut down completely as soon as a minimum-demand threshold is crossed.  As stated above, 
such approaches may be understandable in terms of their benefit-cost or reputation-building 
value.  However, it has been argued here that completely terminating such services, without 
leaving clearly-signposted contingencies for the remaining minority of the population, who may 
be experiencing real difficulty in returning to „normality‟, risks assigning potentially 
disproportionate amounts of anguish to this group. 
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Finally, the Hull research suggests that community emergency planning is not regarded as a 
practical household approach to vulnerability reduction (Section 4.4).  People who do plan „know 
what to do next time‟ a flood happens and, therefore, they may save more of their valued or 
valuable possessions than otherwise.  However, as outlined in Section 4.4, unless a property 
has been equipped with resistance or resilience measures, it is likely that the amount of damage 
that can be avoided will be minimal.  Consequently, expensive and disruptive rebuilding is likely 
to be necessary and it is therefore hardly surprising that what causes flood-affected people the 
greatest concern is the thought of having to go through the recovery process again.  Let‟s ask 
two rhetorical questions here to put ourselves in the place of those residents: (1) how does a 
household or community develop a plan for how it is going to negotiate the recovery of a 
damaged property with a combination of [delete as appropriate] loss adjuster/builder/utility 
company/furniture retailer/landlord/etc.?, and (2) If people with direct hazard experience are not 
able to plan for their journey through the recovery process in this way, what can be expected of 
those who are hazard exposed, but as yet have no hazard experience?  
We are not, of course, suggesting that community emergency plans are of no use.  As explored 
in Section 4.4, we showed how such plans can help people keep themselves and many of their 
belongings safe in an emergency.  Instead, we have raised these rhetorical questions in order to 
highlight the limitations of such approaches. To return to the comments of Leanne, the Hull 
diarist:  “Even with a contingency plan… you can only do so much”.  
This problem is closely linked to another question that was asked at the end of the last section: 
given the critique outlined in this report, is there ever some point at which „recovery 
coordination‟ can revert to being just another day at the office? 
If we think about this question in terms of it relating to the formal Category 1 and 2 responders, 
then it could be suggested that yes, there must be a point at which things move-on from being 
emergency related.  In effect, budgets and manpower provisions can only be sustained if 
emergency-related needs remain above a certain threshold.  Below this threshold the costs 
accrued in maintaining these special services for a shrinking minority, become too large relative 
to the benefit such provision has for the whole population.  This is understandable in a world of 
conflicting and competing priorities.  However, if one of the consequences of terminating 
assistance to this minority is that they suffer still-further protracted problems in returning to 
normality, what of that?  That‟s a problem. 
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In response to such dilemmas, then, the key question is how can we improve NRG and 
associated guidance to deal more effectively with these issues? The following sections of the 
report move on to address this question by suggesting some possible solutions.           
6. Recovery as problem solving 
While an enduring and well-recognized institution or powerful organization should not be 
torn down or radically revised unthinkingly (it is there and has survived for a reason), nor 
should it be accepted uncritically, without reference to performance in acquitting the role 
that society expects of it. (Handmer & Dovers, 2007: p.154) 
The recommendations made in the following sections are united by a subtle but important 
change of emphasis.  This should be considered as an attempt to challenge existing notions of 
what emergency planning should involve.  Dynes (1994), suggests that emergency planning 
should move away from its „command and control‟ approach (i.e. the centralised, top-down, 
approach, which treats emergencies as largely analogous to an enemy attack).  Such an 
approach, Dynes posits, disenfranchises the affected public, because it assumes that in an 
emergency the society will become dysfunctional and, therefore, it will inevitably fall to 
professional responders to „restore order‟.  Dynes supports his argument by pointing to the 
wealth of evidence, gleaned over decades of social research, which reveals this assumption of 
public dysfunctionality in disaster is a myth (see also: Barton, 1969; Clarke, 2002; Solnit, 2009).  
Dynes suggests that, in light of this and to be truly inclusive of community interests, emergency 
planning needs to be practiced, not as an opportunity to command and control, but as an 
opportunity to problem solve.  The problem-solving model, he believes: 
… assumes that the resources from the pre-emergency community are relevant and 
sufficient.  And that the conditions of the emergency period will not be characterized by 
social chaos but by continuity of effort and structure. … Thus the primary focus of 
emergency planning efforts should be on the development of mechanisms and techniques 
of coordination which allow an effective response on the part of the organisational 
resources in the community. (ibid., p.156: emphasis added)  
Whilst current UK Civil Protection guidance clearly advocates the imposition of „Command, 
Control and Coordination‟ during emergencies (see ERR: p.62), on looking at recovery guidance 
there is clear evidence of a move toward a more participatory approach.  For example, the latest 
guidance on the role of the Local Resilience Forum promotes recovery principles, which include; 
the adoption of a “community development” perspective, and the need for approaches that are 
“sufficiently flexible to respond to a diversity of community needs” (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.60).  
This is interesting, because „Community Development‟ is a field that is replete with its own rich 
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and oft-contested set of theories and approaches (Ledwith, 2005).  Therefore, as no 
accompanying narrative is provided, exactly how those in the CP-sector are expected to know 
what their tasks are supposed to look like from this „community development perspective‟ is 
unclear.  However, applying informed deduction here, we could divine that it is intended to be 
communities‟ capacities to learn and build resilience through networking that is what we should 
be seeking to develop (Gilchrist, 2003).  In such case, what these principles appear to illustrate, 
is the acknowledgement that recovery is a state that can only be achieved by doing things with 
the affected communities, rather than by doing things to them20.   From this social networking 
perspective then, if individuals, households and communities exposed to hazards, but not yet 
affected by them, cannot organise themselves, in advance, in a way that significantly increases 
their own capacity to recover after an event, who does need to know, in advance, about how to 
deal with this?  
We answer this question in the following section which begins our list of recommendations:   
7. Recommendations 
The recommendations listed here consist of new approaches, text changes and tools that could 
be utilised in order to help ameliorate the particular challenges and oversights that have been 
identified as afflicting NRG: 
7.1 New approaches 
7.1.1 Reducing the recovery gap 
As stated throughout this report, the problem of the recovery gap is a difficult one for the 
Government and CP practitioners to solve directly, as it results from the fact that in the UK the 
longer-term recovery process is largely dictated and managed by the actions of private 
companies, who are outside the direct control of CP legislation and the RCG and who deal with 
people on a very individualised basis.  However, there are two concerns that can be raised in 
response to this.  The first is the importance of the Government continuing to work to ensure 
that the private sector companies involved operate in ways that encourage resilience, promote 
fairness and minimise disruption to residents during recovery.  Such work is outside the scope 
of this report but remains vital to the task of boosting effective recovery and resilience – for 
                                                 
20
 It is Dynes contention that this „doing things with‟ perspective relates not just to recovery but to the 
whole IEM cycle. 
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example, the Government should continue to work with the Association of British Insurers to 
encourage resilient reinstatement during flood repairs.  
The second point is the one we wish to focus on here.  It recognises that, in addition to the 
crucial task of encouraging the private sector to change its ways, the Government has a role to 
play in helping residents deal with the problems of the private sector during recovery.  One of 
the principal learning points that came out of the Hull research was that when people talk to 
each other they can find out ways of helping themselves more effectively.  This is because, 
when doing so they are effectively „comparing notes‟ and sharing knowledge, skills and 
emotional support.  They are thus going some way towards countering the individualised way in 
which recovery is managed by the private sector.  Our research therefore suggests that, if they 
have access to good advice, information and arbitration, people can have a better chance of 
solving their own problems and negotiating their own way along their recovery journey.  
However, such communication does not necessarily arise spontaneously or in a format that is 
helpful to people and it must, therefore, be properly facilitated and linked in to the appropriate 
support and advocacy services.  Thinking about how such communication might be facilitated 
better, it is useful to formally identify here, one group of people whose specialist skills in 
networking, communication and problem solving within and across communities go 
unmentioned in current recovery guidance. 
During the Hull research and later, it was learned that the frontline recovery workers who had 
been amongst the most highly regarded during the recovery period were Hull City Council‟s 
Community Wardens and Community Development Workers and Cumbria County Council‟s 
Community Teams21.  These teams are made up of individuals who are based within 
geographical communities, about which they hold invaluable local knowledge and where they 
have the training and skills to identify and solve problems quickly using flexible approaches 
(Pitchford, 2008).  In Hull and Cumbria this meant that it was these teams that were at the 
forefront of recovery activity, for example, finding local buildings in which to set up 
neighbourhood community centres and organising day trips for affected families.  The fact that 
they provided such a valuable link with the affected communities was not missed by Hull City 
Council, as one of their wardens (who was also a diarist) suggested in an interview for the 
original project that the wardens had really benefitted and gained prestige due to the manner in 
which their contribution to community engagement had been appreciated: 
                                                 
21
 i.e. These are positions that bear similarity to the various Community Teams; Community Development 
Workers; Localism Teams, etc. of other local authorities 
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Interviewer: Do you get a sense that anything positive has come out of the floods or not?  
James:  I think recognition for the wardens from people like the Council because I think 
they‟ve not only recognised the flexibility, how quickly they can respond, but I think they‟ve 
also recognised that they have skills and one of those skills is to talk to the public because 
a lot of people you know, can sit in an office and talk to the public across the table but to go 
out and talk to them in their homes and be understanding.  And we‟ve seen some wardens, 
especially some of the younger ones, who didn‟t want to go out and do it, who were getting 
very upset when they were at somebody‟s house and they were all weeping and they do 
this eight times a day.  And they found that very demoralising and emotional, but they‟ve 
done a super job.  So I think yes, there have been positive things coming out of it.  
James (resident and worker) Interview, November 14th 2007  
Using Wenger‟s (2000) terminology, community workers who perform a networking role, at the 
important interface between communities and between communities and the authorities, could 
be described as professionals who are employed to act as brokers who conduct the boundary 
practice of networking communities together.  In terms of their face-to-face neighbourhood work, 
these individuals are trained in “relationship building, promoting participation and expanding the 
„roles‟ and „capabilities‟ of individuals and the community as a whole” (Pitchford, 2008: p.44).  
According to one of the most influential publications on the role of community work, „The 
Gulbenkian Report‟, there are also two further roles that these boundary people undertake: 
service coordination (i.e. the evaluation of services, and of communication between service 
providers and service users and the securing of new resources) and community planning, which 
is based on the recognition that large organisations [e.g. insurance companies?] and authorities 
can significantly impact on the fortunes of communities and thus need to be influenced by a 
community development perspective (Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1968: cited in Pitchford, 
2008). 
This appears to be a fundamentally important skill set, which is inhered within local authority 
departments throughout the UK.  Yet the potential usefulness that the individuals who hold this 
skill set may have, in facilitating community-based self-help approaches to recovery, is 
effectively missing from NRG.  Is there a lesson to be learnt here from Wenger who says: 
Because brokers often do not fully belong [to any particular community] and may not 
contribute directly to any specific outcome, the value they bring can be overlooked.  
…marginalisation and organisational invisibility are all occupational hazards of brokering.  
Developing the boundary infrastructure of a social learning system means paying attention 
to the people who act as brokers.  Are they falling through the cracks?  Is the value of what 
they bring understood? Is there even a language to talk about it? (Wenger, 2000: p.236) 
To summarise, the need to take a “community development perspective” is promoted within the 
guidance, but the readers of NRG are left entirely to their own devices as to how such an 
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approach can be developed and as to whether it can be developed at all using the current LRF-
centred approach.  Having determined this, it is hoped that the suggestion for further research 
which emanates from this discussion, (Section 8) may reveal opportunities through which this 
problem may be solved.    
7.1.2 Frontline Recovery Work (FLRW) issues 
Community Engagement 
There is a need to acknowledge that the responsibility for dealing with some consequence 
vulnerabilities falls most heavily on partners whose employees are not traditionally defined as 
„Responder‟-trained staff (e.g. Local Authority community and sustainability staff may find 
themselves in situations where their existing roles are being extended: Bardo, 1978).  
Therefore:  
1. It is recommended that Emergency Planning staff should be encouraged to expand their 
links across a wider range of Local Authority departments and voluntary-sector 
organisations.  This should be done in order that effective contingencies for the 
mitigation of consequence vulnerabilities can be co-developed in slow time         
2. Local Authorities should recognise that they have well-trained staff who can provide an 
important conduit for information from the affected community (e.g. advice centre staff / 
community development workers / „recovery coordinators‟ and in the future „Community 
Organisers‟).  These staff work closely with individuals and affected communities.  
Therefore, they are likely to understand what problems these people are facing and how 
many people are facing them, with greater clarity than those in more removed positions.   
Accordingly, whilst the RCG is designed as a strategic-level structure, a principal priority 
of the RCG should be to develop strategy that is fully informed by this frontline 
experience (i.e. there must be a way for information about community needs to travel 
from the bottom up, not just from the top down) 
o For example, it should be advocated that a „Community Team‟ representative sits 
on the RCG community engagement sub-group   
FLRW welfare 
Front line recovery work can be rewarding but also very stressful, particularly for those staff who 
have themselves been affected by the emergency-inducing hazard.  Therefore, it is 
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recommended that these staff should be acknowledged as working „beyond the call of [normal] 
duty‟. 
It is also recommended that the value and challenges of frontline recovery work should be 
formally acknowledged, with an amendment to Chapter 7 of „Emergency Response and 
Recovery‟  
7.1.3 Improving services for children and young people experiencing long-term 
recovery effects 
It has been acknowledged that disasters have direct and indirect effects on children and young 
people (see Section 4.2).  Therefore, it is recommended that any schools that have been 
affected by a disaster, or that take in students from disaster-affected schools, should be strongly 
encouraged to seek outside expert guidance on how to best identify and assist any child or 
young person who might be disadvantaged by event or consequence effects22.  
7.2 Text changes to National Recovery Guidance 
Finally, given that the Hull Projects identified the need to differentiate people‟s experience of the 
flood event from their experience of the recovery process, in terms of how effectively they are 
able to restore their homes and to rehabilitate themselves, it was felt important to conduct a 
review of the actual text of the current NRG23.  Particular emphasis was focused on identifying 
places within the existing guidance where it was felt that the complexity of long-term recovery 
could be better communicated to those given the responsibility to plan for it. 
The following sub-section, therefore, lays out a short series of suggested revisions, which 
concentrate on two sub-sections of guidance within the overarching Humanitarian Aspects topic 
area; namely: Needs of people – non-health, and Community Engagement. 
Whilst the concentration will be on improving these two sections, it should be noted that there 
were other places where the „language‟ of NRG and its related guidance, already reflects a 
great deal of the complexity of the recovery process (e.g. the principles of recovery in: Cabinet 
Office, 2011).  Given this fact, it was difficult to identify how minor changes in nuance could 
make the guidance significantly better.  
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 It was felt by the authors that this issue would need to be deliberated across government departments 
(e.g. CO, DfE), therefore, no suggestions were offered in Section 7.2 as to what text formulation might be 
adopted 
23
 Following its move from the UK Resilience website to the Cabinet Office 
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Suggested amendments are appended beneath the extract of original text.   
Needs of people – non-health:  
Sub-section Needs of People: paragraph 1 
Original text 
Of key importance in the planning stage is that all agencies and individuals involved 
recognise the high trauma and stress that those affected may have experienced; and the 
need for a wide range of organisations to have appropriate plans in place to provide an 
appropriate response. It is imperative that organisations ensure staff are adequately 
trained, informed, supervised and supported throughout, as they will be affected by their 
involvement and if emergency responders are unsupported, they risk experiencing 
secondary trauma themselves. 
 
Suggested amendment  
Of key importance in the planning stage is that all agencies and individuals involved 
recognise the high trauma and stress that those affected may have experienced.  However, 
in terms of long-term recovery, it has been found that those who have been hazard-affected 
can also suffer unnecessary additional stress and trauma as a result of the recovery 
process itself.  Threats include: poor practice (e.g. by „cowboy builders‟), and the lack of 
communication between those affected and the organisations responsible for assisting their 
recovery (e.g. insurance agents and/or loss adjusters).  There is, therefore, a need for a 
wide range of organisations to have appropriate plans in place, through which to identify 
these problems and to generate appropriate solutions (e.g. signposting to relevant 
arbitration services).  Given these additional challenges, it is imperative that organisations 
ensure their staff are adequately trained, informed and supervised in their role and that their 
working practices are flexible enough that they can identify and report and/or resolve the 
community‟s recovery-related needs.   
Furthermore, due to the pressures that can be placed on staff working under these 
conditions, it is also vital that they too are supported, because they will be affected by their 
involvement and if they are unsupported, they risk experiencing secondary trauma 
themselves. 
 
Sub-section Needs of People: paragraph 2 
Original text 
A wide and diverse range of agencies in the UK offer assistance, advice and support to 
people on a routine basis and have the capability to play a key role in the recovery phase. 
Planning should cover anything which people are likely to need in the immediate days, 
weeks and months after the emergency. This package of care will necessarily involve a 
range of agencies working together. The exact focus and nature of provision will depend on 
the type of emergency, the impact it has had on the community, and people's needs. 
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Suggested amendment 
Delete: this paragraph is repeated in better context in the „Meeting Needs‟ section that lies 
directly below it on the same page 
 
Humanitarian Aspects - Community Engagement 
Community Engagement: paragraph 2 
Original text 
For example, an early public meeting can allow people to air their concerns and opinions; 
help the community to come to terms with the consequences of the emergency; and 
empower people to influence the scope and order of priorities in the recovery process. 
Depending on the nature of the incident, the inclusion of representatives from local faith 
communities and other relevant groups should be considered, as they can often be the key 
link to minority groups, especially where there are language difficulties and sensitivity 
issues. 
Suggested amendment 
For example, an early public meeting can allow people to air their concerns and opinions; 
help the community to come to terms with the consequences of the emergency; and 
empower people to influence the scope and order of priorities in the recovery process.  In 
engaging the affected population, remember too that there may be people working in either 
the public, private or voluntary sector, who have the training and skills to bring diverse 
communities together in these and smaller forums.  Such people can be useful in facilitating 
deliberations over what „recovery‟ will mean (e.g. restoration or regeneration) and/or as 
arbitrators between conflicting individuals and/or organisations.  Identifying which 
organisations, departments and/or individuals carry these skills and incorporating them into 
plans, beforehand, will mean that they will be able to prepare and resource this role more 
quickly and effectively when needed.  
Depending on the nature of the incident, the inclusion of representatives from local faith 
communities and other relevant groups should be considered, as they can often be the key 
link to minority groups, especially where there are language difficulties and sensitivity 
issues. 
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7.3 Tools for recovery 
As well as recommendations the Hull projects also generated a very useful deliverable 
 “Flood Snakes and Ladders”:  The Hull Project Flood recovery game 
The Flood recovery “Snakes and Ladders” game is a project output, which has been produced 
by Lancaster University and the Hull diarists in collaboration with the Cabinet Office.  In due 
course, everything needed to play the game will be downloadable from the Project website 
The development of the game has created an innovative training and professional development 
resource that will enable the results of our qualitative research project in Hull to be made 
accessible and useful to a wide range of policy and practitioner organisations, including those in 
the field of engineering and physical sciences. Specifically, it is anticipated that the following 
audiences may benefit from participating in the game: 
1) Policy communities. The game will help organisations with a strategic role to play across two 
key areas of policy learning and change:  
a) Flood recovery – UK flood policy is increasingly focused upon the need to build 
resilience and an important part of this process involves finding ways to improve 
people‟s experiences of flood recovery. Using real-life stories to illustrate the findings 
from our research in Hull, the game provides the tools needed to help those in strategic 
roles consider how to provide better help and support to those affected by flooding. 
Beneficiaries include national, regional and local government e.g. Local Authorities, the 
Environment Agency and the Local Government Association. Specific examples include 
the Cabinet Office and the Association of British Insurers, who were on the steering 
group for the original project.  
b) Building resilience to disasters – Current policy initiatives place a strong emphasis on 
the importance of building resilience to the many different types of disasters that could 
affect the UK. Recovery is fundamental to resilience and, by providing a practical 
illustration of the kinds of issues that can arise during the longer-term recovery process, 
the game will help strategic organizations with a role to play in building resilience to 
disasters more generally. Specific examples include the Cabinet Office who are currently 
working on policies to develop Community Resilience within the UK.  
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2) Practitioner communities. By highlighting the problems that can occur during recovery and 
providing examples of best practice, the game will be an important training and professional 
development resource for practitioner communities involved in disaster recovery. Specific 
examples of beneficiaries include those from the building restoration and construction sector, 
including the British Damage Management Association and the Property Care Association 
(trade associations for damage restoration companies). The emergency planning community will 
also benefit from the game. For example, the Cabinet Office Emergency Planning College are 
keen to use the game within courses on recovering from emergencies. Other examples of 
beneficiaries include the Local Government Association, which has a large community of 
emergency planners, and the Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters (CILA), which works with the 
ABI. These organisations will be able to use the game as part of their internal training courses. 
3) Local Communities. The Hull Flood Study shows that many of the problems experienced 
during recovery relate to the ways in which organizations treat the people that they come into 
contact with. By providing tools that policy makers and practitioners can use to improve the 
support that is offered to residents after a disaster, the game will benefit those affected by such 
incidents in future. 
8. Suggestions for future research 
8.1 Identifying the role of Local Authority Community/Localism staff in 
recovery 
It has been suggested that community/localism staff can play a very valuable role in 
ameliorating the effects of long-term recovery at household/community level.  There is, 
however, very little in terms of formal evidence to show what work has been done and/or what 
has been achieved and no recommendations for how these resources could be used most 
effectively.   
This work would seek to identify: 
 The mechanisms through which Local Authority „community‟ staff been engaged with 
recovery activities (e.g. through RCG or other „normal‟ processes) across a number of 
case-studies and types of emergency (e.g. flood, explosion, mass fatality) 
 Identify examples of community-staff led recovery activity 
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 What resources (e.g. meeting venues) and/or skills (e.g. networking) are most useful 
and/or relevant in assisting „community‟ staff practicing in affected neighbourhoods 
 What training would be most useful for community workers to ensure that if an 
emergency happened in their „community‟ they would be able to identify problems and 
potential solutions at the earliest opportunity. 
 What is the threshold of impact (e.g. Social; local BCM) at which it becomes advisable to 
create a dedicated recovery-coordinator post (e.g. as occurred in Cockermouth after the 
2009 floods), rather than relying on existing staff extending their pre-existing community 
organisation roles.  In other words, how much frontline recovery work should staff 
realistically be expected to take on in addition to their existing workloads?  
The main output from the project would be a training package that would be delivered to Local 
Authority „community team‟ members to sensitise them to the issues they may be confronted by 
following an emergency in their community.  
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Appendices 
The Hull Floods Project: Executive Summary  
The report shows that it is often not so much the floods themselves, but what comes afterwards, that 
people find so difficult to deal with. The research on which this report is based aimed to undertake a real-
time longitudinal study to document and understand the everyday experiences of individuals following 
the floods of June 2007 in interaction with networks of actors and organisations, strategies of institutional 
support and investment in the built environment and infrastructure. It had the following objectives:  
 To identify and document key dimensions of the longer term experience of flood impact and 
flood recovery, including health, economic and social aspects.  
 To examine how resilience and vulnerability were manifest in the interaction between everyday 
strategies of adaptation during the flood recovery process, and modes of institutional support and 
the management of infrastructure and the built environment.  
 To explore to what extent the recovery process entailed the development of new forms of 
resilience and to identify the implications for developing local level resilience for flood recovery 
in the future.  
 To develop an archive that will be accessible for future research into other aspects of flood 
recovery.  
The flooding which affected the city of Kingston-upon-Hull took place in June 2007. Over 110mm of rain 
fell during the biggest event, overwhelming the city’s drainage system and resulting in widespread pluvial 
flooding. The floods affected over 8,600 households and one person was killed. Our research used in-
depth, qualitative methods where 44 people kept weekly diaries and participated in interviews and group 
discussions over an 18-month period. We also carried out extensive stakeholder engagement through a 
project steering group, stakeholder presentations, workshops and consultation responses.  
The Recovery Gap  
 Key to the findings is the identification of a ‘recovery gap’.  
 This emerges during the longer process of recovery at the point where the legally-defined 
contingency arrangements provided to the community by its local authority diminish and where 
the less well-defined services provided by the private sector (e.g. insurance, builders etc.) start.  
 The nature of the gap means that residents receive little effective support during this time. As a 
result, they must step in to coordinate the actions of the different private and public sector 
organizations involved. Such project management is challenging, time-consuming and stressful.  
What does the flood recovery process look like?  
 Determining what a flood is, what caused it and who was affected by it is not as straightforward 
as might be expected. The patchwork nature of the water distribution, combined with the role of 
‘expert’ judgements in ascertaining latent water damage can pose particular problems for those 
experiencing damage within their homes.  
 Flood recovery is a long and difficult process with no clear beginning or end point. Far from 
showing a steady process of improvement, it is punctuated by a distinct series of ‘highs’ and 
‘lows’ which are closely tied with other issues that are going on in a person’s life.  
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 People’s experiences of recovery are also linked to the ways in which they are treated by the 
different companies and organizations involved in the recovery process. Many people had to cope 
with the double trauma that occurs when the first disaster (the flood) is compounded by a 
secondary disaster in the form of poor treatment from the various companies and agencies that are 
supposed to be helping with the recovery.  
 Recovery does not end when people move back into their homes and neither do things go back to 
‘normal’ as there are aspects of everyday life which have fundamentally changed – both for better 
and for worse.  
What does the process of flood recovery involve?  
 The recovery process involves new and often psychologically challenging kinds of physical, 
mental and emotional work for residents, many of whom step in to ‘project manage’ the repairs.  
 In addition to the new work of flood recovery, everyday tasks such as washing, cooking and 
commuting can also become more difficult as a result of living in temporary accommodation.  
 Front line workers, who helped and supported flooded residents through their job roles, played an 
important part in the recovery process. Workers can also be vulnerable to the impacts of flood 
recovery – especially if they were also dealing with their own repairs at home.  
What does ‘recovery’ mean’?  
 Flood recovery is about rebuilding a sense of home and community as residents adapt to a new 
and altered set of circumstances.  
 People’s sense of the future also changes in different ways. For some, this means fatalistic 
attitudes towards rain, climate change and government bodies emerging. However, others are 
engaging in debates about public participation in how the built environment is managed, and are 
developing their own ‘resilience’ strategies for future floods.  
Suggestions for Action  
Our study identified some specific ways to address the recovery gap. These are highlighted in Table 2 on 
p.121 of the main report and we recommend that all readers refer to this in addition to reading this 
summary. However, we also identified a series of broader framing issues to do with the ways in flood 
recovery is conceptualised and managed:  
1. Developing more flexible notions of ‘recovery’ in formal frameworks  
Our study shows that recovery is more complex than existing frameworks for recovery delivery allow. As 
a result, it is important to ensure that the support that is given to communities reflects their longer-term 
needs, priorities and timescales, rather than the shorter-term goals of the emergency planning community.  
2. Developing an ‘Ethic of Care’  
Our research shows that there is a very clear link between how flood recovery is managed and how 
residents feel about – and are able to make progress with – their recovery. We propose that key deliverers 
of recovery work should adopt an ‘ethic of care’ to the householder. This will involve encouraging 
different companies and organizations (e.g. loss adjustors, ‘disaster restoration companies’, drying 
companies, builders etc.) to recognize the role that they play in delivering the recovery process, with 
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associated responsibilities towards householders. Developing appropriate support for frontline workers 
should also be included in this ‘ethic of care’.  
3. Building in spare capacity and capability  
This study supports the conclusions of other research on disaster management by showing the need for 
spare capacity and capability within institutions so that they are able to respond to the uncertainties that 
unfold during and after a disaster. Both capacity and capability may emerge from more informal working 
practices rather than those documented in protocols and job descriptions. Promoting greater flexibility in 
terms of both institutional roles and individual job descriptions could therefore be very beneficial. 
Capability and capacity also emerge through facilitating and funding a broader, community-based 
resilience approach, where there is cooperation between formal organisations and community groups.  
4. Enabling ‘collectives’ and new forms of learning and engagement with policy  
Our project methodology shows the importance of creating spaces where people can share their 
experiences in a way that enables them to learn from and support each other, and where key stakeholders 
can attend these events to learn from householders in a facilitated context. The process we have 
developed provides a potentially powerful tool for public participation in policy making.  
5. Understanding and addressing vulnerability  
While vulnerability may, in part, be related to pre-existing social characteristics (our study highlights 
particular issues associated with older people, council tenants and private renters), it is the interaction of 
these factors with the specific circumstances operating in a person’s life which determines how and when 
they may become vulnerable. Vulnerability is therefore a dynamic process that is related to the ways in 
which the recovery process is managed. Thus while specific indicators such as age and disability may 
provide a starting point, our research suggests that it is necessary to give workers greater freedom when 
defining vulnerability so that they can use their knowledge to prioritise those who need help most.  
6. Building resilience  
Table 2 identifies key actions that could be taken to improve flood recovery. However, to build resilience 
for the future will require looking more fundamentally at the characteristics of contemporary social life 
and the vulnerabilities that society generates, at how these are manifest within our built environment and 
reproduced through our institutional frameworks set up to respond to floods and other disasters. We need 
to learn from the ways in which forms of resilience and vulnerability were created, revealed and disrupted 
during the flood and the recovery process. We hope this report has assisted this learning.  
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Hull Children’s Flood Project: Executive Summary 
Summer 2007 was a time of misery for thousands of households as unprecedented rainfall levels resulted in 
widespread flooding across the UK. The flooding was particularly severe in the city of Kingston-upon-Hull. 
Over 110mm of rain fell during the biggest event, overwhelming the city’s drainage system and resulting in 
widespread pluvial flooding. The floods affected over 8,600 households, one man died and 91 of the city’s 99 
schools were affected (Coulthard et al. 2007b). However, our research shows that establishing who was 
affected – and how – is more complex than the statistics suggest. 
This report details the findings from a participatory research project that set out to identify key issues in 
children and young people’s experience in relation to resilience to flooding and the flood recovery process. 
Overall the report shows that the flood recovery process was stressful for the flood-affected children in a 
variety of ways, just as it was for the adults who took part in a ‘sister’ research project24. The children 
differed from the adults in that they found it exciting on the day. However this feeling of exhilaration was 
quickly replaced by frustration caused by the daily disruption they experienced during the long-term recovery 
process.  
Relatively few accounts of flooding have considered the perspectives of children and the role they might play 
in building resilience in the future. Funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, the Environment 
Agency and Hull City Council, the project engaged with children (aged 9-19 years) in Hull and identifies key 
issues in children’s experiences in relation to resilience to flooding, the recovery process and the implications 
for future resilience. Our research used Storyboards (where participants drew pictures or used creative writing 
to tell their stories), short one-to-one interviews and focus groups with 46 young participants. We also 
worked with 18 adults, involving in-depth interviews with key service providers and front line workers, 
together with stakeholder engagement through a project steering group. The project had the following 
objectives: 
1) Document children’s experiences of flood impact and the flood recovery process, including social, 
educational and emotional aspects, and the impacts upon wellbeing.  
2) Analyse the relationship between children’s experiences and their accounts of the role of formal and 
informal support in enabling or inhibiting resilience during the flood recovery process.  
3) Evaluate the lessons learnt by key agencies in the delivery of services for children, as well as wider 
services, in the post-disaster recovery period.  
4) To contribute to the archive generated by the Adult Hull Flood Study and to enable children’s voices to 
become part of the flooding debate. 
 
Key findings 
The children are a diverse group and our research showed their experiences were many and varied. Hence, 
there is no such thing as a homogenous ‘child’s perspective’ on the floods.  However, there are certain shared 
experiences that provide an insight into how disaster recovery can be improved: 
 The children’s accounts suggest that they already had complex routines and family and social relations. 
These were disrupted in a number of ways and it is therefore important to contextualise the floods within 
the rest of their lives. The children who were flooded at school and at home (and in some cases at both 
their mother’s and father’s separate homes) experienced extra pressures in coping during the recovery 
process.  It is also important to contextualise the impact of the floods within the broader context of the city 
                                                 
24
 Whittle, R., Medd, W., Deeming, H., Kashefi, E., Mort, M., Twigger Ross, C., Walker, G., Watson, N. (2010) After the Rain – 
learning the lessons from flood recovery in Hull, final project report for „Flood, Vulnerability and Urban Resilience: a real-time study 
of local recovery following the floods of June 2007 in Hull‟, Lancaster University, Lancaster UK www.lec.lancs.ac.uk/cswm/hfp 
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itself. Hull is characterised by high levels of socio-economic deprivation and many of the children came 
from low income households, which had a further impact on the family’s ability to recover. 
 The children’s experiences changed over time; at the start of the flood it was exciting for some of them 
(e.g. moving out of their home and into a caravan was an adventure) but this exhilaration quickly 
subsided. As a result, it is important to pay attention to the recovery process and not just the event itself.  
 The children talked in detail about the disruption (at home and at school); their losses (both tangible e.g. 
possessions and intangible e.g. family time) and the ensuing stress this caused, leaving some with a 
pragmatic approach and others fearful about how they would cope if it happened again. 
 The children’s positive and negative coping strategies and the subsequent changes that the flood brought 
to their lives are linked to how their parents and teachers reacted. Having some involvement in the repairs 
and recovery process helped the children to cope better, such as being included in family discussions or 
providing practical help (e.g. helping to move belongings upstairs, taking tea to the builders). 
 Some older children were ‘forgotten’. The data reveal a recovery gap particularly amongst the 
adolescents: i) youth workers assumed the adolescents were being helped at school and at home, whereas 
some teenagers had no-one to turn to and ii) pupils in transition from primary to secondary school 
(particularly the 2007 Year 5 cohort who moved in 2008), who had not been recognised at school as flood-
affected pupils.      
Suggestions for Post Disaster Recovery Action 
1. Policy makers, practitioners and researchers need to pay more attention to the recovery process and 
how children can be supported at home and at school.  
2. Parents and carers need to consider ways in which they can involve (rather than exclude) children in 
the recovery process.    
3. The education system (at both local and national level) needs to take the long-term recovery process 
into account for individual pupils, especially pupils in transition between schools and for those about 
to begin, or currently working towards, examinations, such as GCSEs.  
4. Key service workers need to adopt a more flexible understanding of vulnerability so that the needs and 
concerns of all children and young people are considered. They should also be proactive when 
offering support because children and young people will not necessarily ask for help. 
5. It is important to provide effective support for the front line workers (for example, teachers, classroom 
assistants, youth group leaders etc.) who work with children and young people.  
6. It is important to accommodate children and young people’s voices into building resilience for the 
future – for example, in order to help deal with the challenges of climate change. Service workers 
should talk to flood-affected children about their experiences of living though an extreme weather 
event and the kinds of changes they would like to see in future. 
7. Storyboards may be a helpful means of incorporating children’s voices into policy and practice. We 
suggest that schools and youth groups consider using storyboards to help young people deal with 
floods and other kinds of disaster recovery. 
8. More needs to be done to enable research to be commissioned quickly in the aftermath of disasters.  
In addition to its core focus on floods, the report’s conclusions have relevance to other forms of disaster 
recovery as well as wider issues of institutional change management involving children and young people. 
Project team Will Medd, Marion Walker and Rebecca Whittle (Lancaster University), Kate Burningham and 
Jo Moran-Ellis (University of Surrey), Sue Tapsell (Middlesex University) 
 
 
 
